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Competitive Design of Multiuser MIMO Systems
based on Game Theory: A Unified View
Gesualdo Scutari, Member, IEEE, Daniel P. Palomar, Member, IEEE, and Sergio Barbarossa, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper considers the noncooperative maximiza-
tion of mutual information in the Gaussian interference channel
in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has
been studied in a number of papers during the past decade for
the case of frequency-selective channels. A variety of conditions
guaranteeing the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and
convergence of many different distributed algorithms have been
derived. In this paper we provide a unified view of the state-of-
the-art results, showing that most of the techniques proposed in
the literature to study the game, even though apparently different,
can be unified using our recent interpretation of the waterfilling
operator as a projection onto a proper polyhedral set. Based on
this interpretation, we then provide a mathematical framework,
useful to derive a unified set of sufficient conditions guaranteeing
the uniqueness of the NE and the global convergence of water-
filling based asynchronous distributed algorithms.
The proposed mathematical framework is also instrumental to
study the extension of the game to the more general MIMO case,
for which only few results are available in the current literature.
The resulting algorithm is, similarly to the frequency-selective
case, an iterative asynchronous MIMO waterfilling algorithm.
The proof of convergence hinges again on the interpretation
of the MIMO waterfilling as a matrix projection, which is the
natural generalization of our results obtained for the waterfilling
mapping in the frequency-selective case.
Index Terms—Game Theory, MIMO Gaussian interference
channel, Nash equilibrium, totally asynchronous algorithms,
waterfilling.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE interference channel is a mathematical model relevantto many physical communication channels and multiuser
systems where multiple uncoordinated links share a common
communication medium, such as digital subscriber lines [1],
single (or multi) antenna cellular radio, ad-hoc wireless net-
works [2], [3], and cognitive radio systems [4].
The interference channel is characterized by its capacity
region, defined as the set of rates that can be simultaneously
achieved by the users in the system while making the error
probability arbitrary small. A pragmatic approach that leads
to an achievable region or inner bound of the capacity region
is to restrict the system to operate as a set of independent
units, i.e., not allowing multiuser encoding/decoding or the
use of interference cancellation techniques. This approach is
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very relevant in practical systems, as it limits the amount of
signaling among the users. With this assumption, multiuser
interference is treated as additive colored noise and the system
design reduces to finding the optimum covariance matrix of
the symbols transmitted by each user.
Within this context, in this paper we consider the maximiza-
tion of mutual information in a fully distributed fashion using a
game theoretical approach. Since the seminal paper of Yu et al.
[7] in 2002 (and the conference version in 2001), this problem
has been studied in a number of works during the past seven
years for the case of SISO frequency-selective channels or,
equivalently, a set of parallel non-interfering scalar channels
[8]-[20]. In the cited papers, the maximization of mutual
information is formulated as a strategic noncooperative game,
where every SISO link is a player that competes against the
others by choosing his power allocation (transmission strategy)
over the frequency bins (or parallel channels) to maximize
his own information rate (payoff function).1 Based on the
celebrated notion of Nash Equilibrium (NE) in game theory
(cf. [5], [6]), an equilibrium for the whole system is reached
when every player’s reaction is “unilaterally optimal”, i.e.,
when, given the rival players’ current strategies, any change
in a player’s own strategy would result in a rate loss. This
vector-valued power control game was widely studied and
several sufficient conditions have been derived that guarantee
the uniqueness of the NE and the convergence of alternative
distributed waterfilling based algorithms: synchronous sequen-
tial [7]-[14], synchronous simultaneous [14], [15], [16], [19],
and asynchronous [17], [20].
Interestingly, different approaches have been used in the
cited papers to analyze the game, most of them based on
the following, apparently different, key results: 1) the in-
terpretation of the waterfilling operator as a projection onto
a proper polyhedral set [14], [19]; 2) the interpretation of
the Nash equilibria of the game as solutions of a proper
affine Variational Inequality (VI) problem [12]; and 3) the
interpretation of the waterfilling mapping as a piecewise affine
function [16], [40, Ch. 4]. In this paper, we provide a unified
view of these results, showing that they fit naturally in our
1The choice of the gender of the players is always controversial in the
literature of game theory. This is reflected mainly on the use the third-person
singular pronouns: some authors use “his", while others use “her”, and others–
more diplomatic ones–even use “his/her”. English non-native speakers tend
to use “its” to avoid the problem but that is not well accepted by native
speakers. In two-player zero-sum games, the issue is even trickier and some
authors resort to the use of one gender for the good player and another for
the bad player. See the foreword in [5] for a related discussion on the issue.
In this paper, for simplicity of notation and without further implications, we
simply use “his”.
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interpretation of the waterfilling mapping as a projector [14],
[19]. Building on this interpretation and using classical results
from fixed-point and contraction theory (cf. [22], [24], [25],
[26]), we then develop a mathematical framework useful to
derive a unified set of sufficient conditions guaranteeing both
the uniqueness of the NE and the convergence of totally
asynchronous iterative waterfilling based algorithms.
The proposed mathematical framework is instrumental to
study the more general MIMO case, which is a nontrivial
extension of the SISO frequency-selective case. There are
indeed only a few papers that have studied (special cases of)
the MIMO game [21], [27]-[31]. In [27], the authors focused
on the two-user MISO channel. In [28]-[30], the authors
considered the rate maximization game in MIMO interference
channels, but they provided only numerical results to support
the existence of a NE of the game. Furthermore, in these
papers there is no study of the uniqueness of the equilibrium
and convergence of the proposed algorithms. Finally, in [31],
the authors showed that the MIMO rate maximization game is
a concave game (in the sense of [32]), implying the existence
of a NE for any set of arbitrary channel matrices [32, Theorem
1]. As far as the uniqueness of the equilibrium is concerned,
they only showed that if the multiuser interference is almost
negligible, then the NE is unique, without quantifying how
small the interference must be. Hence, a practical condition
that one can check to guarantee the uniqueness of the NE of the
game and convergence of distributed algorithms is currently
missing.
The main difficulty in the MIMO case is that the optimal
transmit directions (i.e., eigenvectors of the transmit covari-
ance matrix) of each user change with the strategies of the
other users, as opposed to the SISO frequency-selective case
where only the power allocation depends on the strategies of
the others, but the directions remain fixed: i) in the diagonal
MIMO case, the transmit directions are always the canonical
vectors [7]-[14]; ii) in the frequency-selective channel, the
transmit directions are the Fourier vectors [18], [19]; iii) for the
MISO case, the transmit directions are matched to the vector
channels; and iv) for the SIMO case, there are no transmit
directions to optimize. For the previous reason, the existing
results and techniques in [7]-[20], valid for SISO frequency-
selective channels, cannot be applied or trivially extended
to the MIMO case. On top of that, another difficulty is the
fact that, differently from the vector power control game in
[7]-[19], where there exists an explicit relationship (via the
waterfilling solution) among the optimal power allocations of
all the users, in the matrix-valued MIMO game one cannot
obtain an explicit expression of the optimal covariance matrix
of each user at the NE (the MIMO waterfilling solution), as a
function of the optimal covariance matrices of the other users,
but there exists only a complicated implicit relationship, via
an eigedecomposition.
Building on the mathematical framework developed for the
SISO case, we can overcome the main difficulties in the
study of the MIMO game invoking a novel interpretation
of the MIMO waterfilling operator as a projector and its
nonexpansion property, similar to the one for frequency-
selective channels. This enables us to derive a unified set
of sufficient conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium of the MIMO game and the convergence
of totally asynchronous distributed algorithms based on the
MIMO waterfilling solution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
system model and formulates the optimization problem as a
strategic noncooperative game. In Section III, we draw the
relationship between Nash equilibria of the game and fixed
points of nonlinear sets of equations, and provide the math-
ematical tools necessary to study convergence of distributed
asynchronous algorithms. Building on the interpretation of the
multiuser waterfilling solution as a proper projection onto a
convex set, in Section IV, we provide the main properties
of the multiuser waterfilling solution either in the SISO or
MIMO case, unifying previous results proposed in the litera-
ture to study the rate maximization game in SISO frequency-
selective channels. The contraction property of the multiuser
waterfilling paves the way to derive sufficient conditions guar-
anteeing the uniqueness of the fixed point of the waterfilling
projector−alias the NE of the (SISO/MIMO) game−and the
convergence of iterative, possibly asynchronous, distributed
algorithms, as detailed in Sections V and VI, respectively.
Section VII reports some numerical results illustrating the ben-
efits of MIMO transceivers in the multiuser context. Finally,
Section VIII draws some conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we introduce the system model and formulate
the optimization problem addressed in the paper explicitly.
A. System Model
We consider a vector Gaussian interference channel com-
posed of Q links. In this model, there are Q transmitter-
receiver pairs, where each transmitter wants to communicate
with its corresponding receiver over a MIMO channel. The
transmission over the generic q-th MIMO channel with nTq
transmit and nRq receive dimensions can be described with
the baseband signal model
yq = Hqqxq +
∑
r 6=q
Hrqxr + nq, (1)
where xq∈ CnTq is the vector transmitted by source
q, Hqq∈ CnRq×nTq is the direct channel of link q,
Hrq∈ CnRq×nTr is the cross-channel matrix between source
r and destination q, yq∈ CnRq is the vector received by desti-
nation q, and nq∈ CnRq is a zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise vector with arbitrary covariance ma-
trix Rnq (assumed to be nonsingular). The second term on the
right-hand side of (1) represents the Multi-User Interference
(MUI) received by the q-th destination and caused by the other
active links. For each transmitter q, the total average transmit
power is
E
{
‖xq‖22
}
= Tr (Qq) ≤ Pq, (2)
where Tr (·) denotes the trace operator, Qq , E
{
xqx
H
q
}
is
the covariance matrix of the transmitted vector xq , and Pq is
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the maximum average transmitted power in units of energy
per transmission.
The system model in (1)-(2) provides a unified way to rep-
resent many physical communication channels and multiuser
systems of practical interest. What changes from one system
to the other is the structure of the channel matrices. We may
have, in fact, as particular cases of (1)-(2): i) digital subscriber
lines [1], where the channel matrices are Toeplitz circulant,
the matrices Qq = WDiag(pq)WH incorporate the DFT
precoding WH , the vectors pq allocate the power across the
frequency bins, and the MUI is mainly caused by near-end
cross talk; ii) single (or multi) antenna CDMA cellular radio
systems, where the matrices Qq = FqFHq contain in Fq the
user codes within a given cell, and the MUI is essentially
intercell interference [2]; iii) ad-hoc wireless MIMO networks,
where the channel matrices represent the MIMO channel of
each link [3].
Since our goal is to find distributed algorithms that do
not require neither a centralized control nor a coordination
among the links, we focus on transmission techniques where
no interference cancellation is performed and multiuser inter-
ference is treated as additive colored noise from each receiver.
Each channel is assumed to change sufficiently slowly to be
considered fixed during the whole transmission, so that the
information theoretical results are meaningful. Moreover, per-
fect channel state information at both transmitter and receiver
sides of each link is assumed;2 each receiver is also assumed
to measure with no errors the covariance matrix of the noise
plus MUI generated by the other users. Finally, we assume that
the channel matrices Hqq are square nonsingular. The more
general case of possibly rectangular nonfull rank matrices is
addressed in [21].
Under these assumptions, invoking the capacity expression
for the single user Gaussian MIMO channel−achievable us-
ing random Gaussian codes by all the users−the maximum
information rate on link q for a given set of users’ covariance
matrices Q1, . . . ,QQ is [33]
Rq(Qq,Q−q) = log det
(
I+HHqqR
−1
−q(Q−q)HqqQq
) (3)
where R−q(Q−q) , Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq is the MUI plus
noise covariance matrix observed by user q, and Q−q ,
(Qr)
Q
r=1, r 6=q is the set of all the users’ covariance matrices,
except the q-th one.
B. Game Theoretical Formulation
We formulate the system design within the framework of
game theory using as desirable criterion the concept of Nash
Equilibrium (NE) (cf. [5], [6]). Specifically, we consider
a strategic noncooperative game, in which the players are
the links and the payoff functions are the information rates
on each link: Each player q competes against the others by
choosing his transmit covariance matrix Qq (i.e., his strategy)
that maximizes his own information rate Rq(Qq,Q−q) in (3),
subject to the transmit power constraint (2). A solution of the
2Note that each user q is only required to known his own channel Hqq ,
but not the cross-channels {Hrq}r 6=q from the other users.
game−a NE−is reached when each user, given the strategy
profiles of the others, does not get any rate increase by
unilaterally changing his own strategy. Stated in mathematical
terms, the game has the following structure:
(G ) :
maximize
Qq
Rq(Qq,Q−q)
subject to Qq ∈ Qq,
∀q ∈ Ω,
(4)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of players (i.e., the links);
Rq(Qq,Q−q) defined in (3) is the payoff function of player
q; and Qq is the set of admissible strategies (the covariance
matrices) for player q, defined as3
Qq ,
{
Q ∈ CnTq×nTq : Q  0, Tr{Q} = Pq
}
. (5)
The solutions of game G are formally defined as follows.4
Definition 1: A (pure) strategy profile Q⋆ = (Q⋆q)q∈Ω ∈
Q1 × . . .×QQ is a NE of game G if
Rq(Q
⋆
q ,Q
⋆
−q) ≥ Rq(Qq,Q⋆−q), ∀Qq ∈ Qq, ∀q ∈ Ω. (6)

To write the Nash equilibria of game G in a convenient
form, we first introduce the following notations and defini-
tions. Given G , for each q ∈ Ω and Q−q ∈ Q−q , Q1× . . .×
Qq−1,Qq+1× . . .×QQ, we write the eigendecomposition of
HHqqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq as:
HHqqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq=UqDqU
H
q , (7)
where Uq = Uq(Q−q) ∈ CnTq×nTq is a unitary matrix with
the eigenvectors, Dq = Dq(Q−q) ∈ RnTq×nTq++ is a diagonal
matrix with the nTq positive eigenvalues, and R−q(Q−q) =
Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq.
Given q ∈ Ω and Q−q ∈ Q−q, the solution to problem (4)
is the well-known waterfilling solution (e.g., [33]):
Q⋆q =WFq(Q−q), (8)
with the waterfilling operator WFq (·) defined as
WFq (Q−q) , Uq
(
µqI−D−1q
)+
UHq , (9)
where Uq = Uq(Q−q), Dq = Dq(Q−q), and µq is chosen to
satisfy Tr
{
(µqI−D−1q )+
}
= Pq , with (x)+ , max(0, x).
Using (8) and Definition 1, we can now characterize the
Nash Equilibria of the game G in a compact way as the
following waterfilling fixed-point equation:
Q⋆q =WFq(Q
⋆
−q) , ∀q ∈ Ω. (10)
Remark 1 - Competitive maximization of transmission rates.
The choice of the objective function as in (3) requires the
3Observe that, in the definition of Qq in (5) the condition Q = QH is
redundant, since any complex positive semidefinite matrix must be necessarily
Hermitian [41, Sec. 7.1]. Furthermore, we replaced, without loss of generality
(w.l.o.g.), the original inequality power constraint in (2) with equality, since,
at the optimum to each problem in (4), the constraint must be satisfied with
equality.
4Observe that, for the payoff functions defined in (3), we can indeed limit
ourselves to adopt pure strategies w.l.o.g., as we did in (3), since every NE
of the game can be proved to be achievable using pure strategies [18].
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use of ideal Gaussian codebooks with a proper covariance
matrix. In practice, Gaussian codes may be substituted with
simple (suboptimal) finite-order signal constellations, such as
Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) or Pulse Ampli-
tude Modulation (PAM), and practical (suboptimal) coding
schemes. In this case, instead of considering the maximization
of mutual information on each link, one can focus on the
competitive maximization of the transmission rate, using finite
order constellation, under constraints on transmit power and on
the average error probability P ⋆e,q (see [18] for more details).
Interestingly, using a similar approach to that in [18], one can
prove that the optimal transmission strategy of each user is
still a solution to the fixed-point equation in (10), where each
channel matrix Hqq is replaced by Hqq/Γq, where Γq ≥ 1
denotes the gap, which depends only on the constellations and
on the target error probability P ⋆e,q [34].
Remark 2 - Related works. The matrix nature of game G
and the arbitrary structure of the channel matrices make the
analysis of the game quite complicated, since none of the
results in game theory literature can be directly applied to
characterize solutions of the form (10). The main difficulty
in the analysis comes from the fact that, for each user q, the
optimal eigenvector matrix U⋆q = Uq(Q⋆−q) in (9) depends, in
general, on the strategies Q⋆−q of all the others, through a very
complicated implicit relationship−the eigendecomposition of
the equivalent channel matrix HHqqR−1−q(Q⋆q)Hqq.
In the vector power control games studied in [7]-[20], the
analysis of uniqueness of the equilibrium was mathematically
more tractable, since scalar frequency-selective channels are
represented by diagonal matrices (or Toeplitz and circulant
matrices [18], [19]), implying that the optimal set of eigenvec-
tors of any NE becomes user-independent [18]. In the present
case, it follows that, because of the dependence of the optimal
strategy U⋆q(Q⋆−q) of each user on the strategy profile of the
others at the NE, one cannot use the uniqueness condition of
the NE obtained in [7]-[20] to guarantee the uniqueness of the
NE of game G in (4), even if game G reduces to the power
control game studied in the cited papers, once the optimal
users’ strategy profile in (10) is introduced in (4). At the best
of our knowledge, the only paper where game G was partially
analyzed is [31], where the authors applied the framework
developed in [32] to the MIMO game and showed that the NE
becomes unique if the MUI in the system−the interference-to-
noise ratio at each receiver−is sufficiently small, but without
quantifying exactly how much small the MUI must be. Thus,
a practical condition that one can check to guarantee the
uniqueness of the NE is still missing.
To overcome the difficulties in the study of game G , we pro-
pose next an equivalent expression of the waterfilling solution
enabling us to express the Nash equilibria in (10) as a fixed-
point of a more tractable mapping. This alternative expression
is based on the new interpretation of the MIMO waterfilling
solution as a proper projector operator. Based on this result, we
can then derive sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the
NE and convergence of asynchronous distributed algorithms,
as detailed in Sections V and VI respectively.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AS A FIXED POINT
Before providing one of the major results of the paper−the
contraction properties of the MIMO multiuser waterfilling
projector−we recall and unify some standard results from
fixed-point [25] and contraction theory [22], [24] that will be
instrumental for our derivations (recall from (10) that any NE
can be interpreted as a fixed point of the waterfilling mapping).
The proposed unified mathematical framework is also useful to
establish an interesting link among the alternative, apparently
different, approaches proposed in the literature to study the rate
maximization game in SISO frequency-selective interference
channels [7]-[14], showing that most of the results in [7]-[14]
can be unified by our interpretation of the waterfilling as a
projector [14], [19].
A. Existence and Uniqueness of a Fixed-point
Let T : X 7→ X be any mapping from a subset X ⊆ Rn to
itself. One can associate T to a dynamical system described
by the following discrete-time equation:
x(n+ 1) = T(x(n)), n ∈ N+, (11)
where x(n) ∈ Rn is the vector of the state variables of the
system at (discrete) time n, with x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn. The
equilibria of the system, if they exist, are the vectors x⋆
resulting as a solution of x⋆ = T(x⋆), i.e., the fixed-points
of mapping T. The study of the existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium of a dynamical system has been widely
addressed either in fixed-point theory (cf. [22], [24], [25]) or
control theory (cf. [26], [35], [36]) literature. Many alternative
conditions are available. Throughout this paper, we will use
the following.
Theorem 1: Given the dynamical system in (11) with T :
X 7→ X and X ⊆ Rn, we have the following:
a) Existence (cf. [24], [25]): If X is nonempty, convex and
compact, and T is a continuous mapping, then there exists
some x⋆ such that x⋆ = T(x⋆);
b) Uniqueness (cf. [22], [24], [25]): If X is closed and T is a
contraction in some vector norm ‖·‖ , with modulus α ∈ [0, 1),
i.e.,∥∥∥T(x(1))−T(x(2))∥∥∥ ≤ α ∥∥∥x(1) − x(2)∥∥∥ , ∀x(1),x(2) ∈ X ,
(12)
then the fixed-point of T is unique. 
Remark 3 - Sufficiency of the conditions. The conditions of
Theorem 1 are only sufficient for the existence and uniqueness
of the fixed point. However, this does not mean that some of
them can be removed. For example, the convexity assumption
in the existence condition cannot, in general, be removed, as
the simple one-dimensional example T (x) = −x and X =
{−c, c} , with c ∈ R, shows.
Remark 4 - Choice of the norm. The contractive property of
the mapping is norm-dependent, in the sense that a mapping
may be contractive for some choice of the norm on Rn
and, at the same time, it may fail to be so under a different
norm. On the other hand, it may happen that a mapping is a
contraction in more than one norm. In such a case, even though
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the uniqueness of the fixed-point is guaranteed whatever the
choice of the norm is (cf. Theorem 1), the convergence of
different algorithms, based on the same mapping T, to the
fixed-point is, in general, norm-dependent. Thus, the choice
of the proper norm is a critical issue and it actually gives us
potential degrees of freedom to be explored in the characteri-
zation of the convergence properties of the desired algorithms
used to reach the fixed-point. We address this issue in the next
sections, where we introduce a proper norm, tailored to our
needs.
B. Convergence to a Fixed-point
Nonlinear fixed-point problems are typically solved by itera-
tive methods, especially when one is interested in distributed
algorithms [22], [24]. In fact, the mapping x 7→ T(x) can be
interpreted as an algorithm for finding such a fixed point. The
degrees of freedom are in the choice of the specific updating
scheme among the components of vector x, based on mapping
T. More specifically, denoting by x = (x1, . . . ,xQ) a partition
of x, with xq ∈ Rnq and n1 + . . . + nQ = n, and assuming
X = X 1×· · ·×XQ,5 with each Xq ⊆ Rnq , the most common
updating strategies for x1, . . . ,xQ based on mapping T are
[22], [24]:
i) Jacobi scheme: All components x1, . . . ,xQ are up-
dated simultaneously, via the mapping T;
ii) Gauss-Seidel scheme: All components x1, . . . ,xQ
are updated sequentially, one after the other, via the
mapping T;
iii) Totally asynchronous scheme: All components
x1, . . . ,xQ are updated in a totally asynchronous
way (in the sense of [22]), via the mapping T. Ac-
cording to this scheme, some components xq may be
updated more frequently than others and, when they
are updated, a possibly outdated information on the
other components can be used. Some variations of
such a totally asynchronous scheme, e.g., including
constraints on the maximum tolerable delay in the
updating and on the use of the outdated information
(which leads to the so-called partially asynchronous
algorithms), can also be considered [22].
Observe that the latter algorithm contains, as special cases, the
first two ones. In general, the above algorithms converge to the
fixed-point of T under different conditions [22], [24]. How-
ever, we can obtain a unified set of convergence conditions
(not necessarily the mildest ones) by studying the contraction
properties of mappingT under a proper choice of the norm. To
prove the convergence of the totally asynchronous algorithms,
a useful norm is the so-called block-maximum norm, defined
as follows. According to the partition x1, . . . ,xQ of x and
T = (Tq)
Q
q=1, with Tq : X 7→ Xq, let ‖·‖q denote any vector
norm on Rnq for each q, the block-maximum norm on Rn is
defined as [22], [24]
‖T‖block = maxq ‖Tq‖q . (13)
5For the sake of simplicity, we focus on mappings T whose domain can
be written as the Cartesian product of lower dimensional sets, associated to
the partition of the mapping. For our purposes, this choice is enough, since
the joint admissible strategy set of game G satisfies this condition.
The mappingT is said to be a block-contraction with modulus
α ∈ [0, 1) if it is a contraction in the block-maximum norm
with modulus α. A unified set of convergence conditions for
distributed algorithms based on mapping T is given in the
following theorem, whose proof follows the same steps as in
[20, Appendix A] and is omitted here because of the space
limitation (see also [21]).
Theorem 2: Given the mapping T = (Tq)
Q
q=1 : X 7→ X ,
with X = X 1×· · ·×XQ, assume that T is a block-contraction
with modulus α ∈ [0, 1). Then, the totally asynchronous
algorithm (cf. [22]) based on the mapping T asymptotically
converges to the unique fixed-point of T, for any set of initial
conditions in X and updating schedule. 
Theorem 2 provides a unified set of convergence conditions
for all the algorithms that are special cases of the totally asyn-
chronous algorithm. Weaker conditions can still be obtained if
one is not interested in a totally asynchronous implementation.
For example, if only the Jacobi updating scheme is considered,
to prove the contraction property of T, one can use any
arbitrary norm on Rn [22], [24].
C. Contraction Theory, Lyapunov Function, and Variational
Inequality Problems
Contraction theory is not the only instrument available
to prove the convergence of distributed algorithms to the
fixed-point of a mapping T. So far, we have seen that any
mapping T defines a dynamical system (see (11)). Hence, the
convergence of distributed algorithms to the fixed-point of T
can be reformulated as the study of the globally asymptotic
stability of the equilibrium of a proper dynamical system,
based on T. From this perspective, Lyapunov theory is a
valuable instrument to study the system behavior and, as a
by-product, the convergence of distributed algorithms [26],
[35]. Indeed, the contraction property of mapping T in the
vector norm ‖·‖ implies the existence of a valid Lyapunov
function for the dynamical system in (11) [26], [35], given
by V (x) = ‖x−x⋆‖ . This guarantees the convergence of a
Jacobi scheme based on mapping T. Interestingly, in the case
of contraction of mappingT in the block maximum norm (13),
the Lyapunov function V (x) = ‖x−x⋆‖block can be interpreted
as the common Lyapunov function of a set of interconnected
dynamical systems, each of them associated to the partition
x1, . . . ,xQ of x [36].
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the convergence to
the fixed-point of a mappingT can also be studied introducing
a proper transformation of T that preserves the set of the fixed-
points. A useful tool to explore this direction is given by the
variational inequality theory [39], [40] (see, e.g., [12], [19]
and Section IV-A for an application of this framework to the
multiuser waterfilling mapping).
We are now ready to apply the previous general framework
to the multiuser waterfilling mapping in (9), as detailed next.
IV. CONTRACTION PROPERTIES OF THE MULTIUSER
WATERFILLING MAPPING
So far we have seen that a unified set of conditions
guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE and the convergence
JOURNAL OF SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. ?, NO. ?, SEPTEMBER 2008 6
of totally asynchronous algorithms to the fixed-point Nash
equilibria of game G can be obtained deriving conditions for
the multiuser waterfilling mapping in (9) to be a contraction
in a proper block-maximum norm (see Theorems 1 and 2).
In this section we then provide a contraction theorem for
the multiuser waterfilling operator. Our result is based on
the interpretation of MIMO waterfilling operator as a matrix
projection onto the convex set of feasible strategies of the
users. This result is also useful to obtain a unified view of,
apparently different, techniques used in the literature to study
the uniqueness of the NE and the convergence of alternative
waterfilling based algorithms in the rate-maximization game
over SISO frequency-selective Gaussian interference channels
[7]-[20]. To show this interesting relationship, we start from
an overview of the main properties of the Nash equilibria of
game G in the case of SISO frequency-selective Gaussian
interference channels, as obtained in [14], [19], [20], [12],
[16], and [7], [15], and then we consider the more general
MIMO case.
A. Frequency-Selective Gaussian Interference Channels
In the case of block transmission over SISO frequency-
selective channels [7]-[20], each channel matrix Hrq ∈ CN×N
becomes a Toeplitz circulant matrix and nTq = nRq = N,
where N is the length of the transmitted block (see, e.g., [18]).
This leads to the eigendecomposition Hrq = WDrqWH ,
where W ∈ CN×N is the normalized IFFT matrix, i.e.,
[W]ij , e
j2π(i−1)(j−1)/N/
√
N for i, j = 1, . . . , N and Drq
is a N ×N diagonal matrix, where [Drq]kk , Hrq(k) is the
frequency-response of the channel between source r and des-
tination q at carrier k, and Rnq = Diag(σ2q(1), . . . , σ2q(N)).
Under this setup, the matrix game G in (4) reduces to a simpler
power control game, where the strategy of each user q becomes
the power allocation pq = [pq(1), . . . , pq(N)]T over the N
carriers and the admissible strategy set in (5) reduces to6
Pq ,
{
x ∈ RN+ :
N∑
k=1
xk = Pq, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
,
(14)
and P , P1× . . .×PQ. It follows that the optimal strategy
at any NE must satisfy the simultaneous multiuser waterfilling
equation:
p⋆q = wfq(p
⋆
−q), ∀q ∈ Ω, (15)
where p−q , (pr)r∈Ω,r 6=q, and the waterfilling operator
wfq (·) becomes [19]
[wfq (p−q)]k ,
(
µq −
σ2q(k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|2pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|2
)+
,
(16)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with the waterlevel µq chosen to satisfy
the power constraint
∑N
k=1 pq(k) = Pq .
6In the transmissions over frequency-selective channels, in addition to the
power constraints as in (14), it may be useful to introduce spectral mask
constraints, in order to impose radiation limits over some (licensed) bands
[12], [19], [20], [14]. Interestingly, all the results presented on this section
are valid also in the presence of spectral mask constraints, as proved in [12],
[19], [20], [14].
Different approaches have been proposed in the literature
to study the properties of the Nash equilibria in (15), each
time obtaining milder conditions for the uniqueness and the
convergence of distributed algorithms [7]-[20]. We provide in
the following a unified view of the techniques used in the
cited papers, based on the mathematical framework described
in Section III.
Approach #1: Multiuser waterfilling as a projector [14],
[19] - We introduce first the following intermediate definitions.
For any given p−q, let insrq(p−q) be the N -dimensional
vector defined as
[insrq(p−q)]k ,
σ2q(k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|2pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|2 , (17)
with k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In order to apply Theorem 2, we
introduce a proper block-maximum norm for the multiuser
waterfilling mapping wf = (wfq(p−q))q∈Ω in (16) (cf.
Section III-B). Given some w , [wq, . . . , wQ]T > 0, let
‖·‖w2,block denote the (vector) block-maximum norm, defined
as [22]
‖wf (p)‖w2,block , maxq∈Ω
∥∥wf
q
(p−q)
∥∥
2
wq
, (18)
where ‖·‖2 is the Euclidean norm. Let ‖·‖w∞,vec be the vector
weighted maximum norm, defined as [41]
‖x‖w∞,vec , maxq∈Ω
|xq|
wq
, w > 0, x ∈ RQ, (19)
and let ‖·‖w∞,mat denote the matrix norm induced by ‖·‖w∞,vec ,
given by [41]
‖A‖w∞,mat , maxq
1
wq
Q∑
r=1
|[A]qr| wr, A ∈ RQ×Q. (20)
We also introduce the nonnegative matrix Smax ∈ RQ×Q+ ,
defined as
[Smax]qr ,

 maxk∈{1,...N}
|Hqr(k)|2
|Hqq(k)|2 , if r 6= q,
0, otherwise.
(21)
Using the above definitions and denoting by [x0]X =
argminz∈X ‖z−x0‖2 the Euclidean projection of vector x0
onto the convex set X , in [14], [19] we proved the following.
Lemma 1 (Waterfilling as a projector): The waterfilling
operator wfq (p−q) in (16) can be equivalently written as
wfq (p−q) = [−insrq(p−q)]Pq , (22)
where Pq and insrq(·) are defined in (14) and (17), respec-
tively. 
It follows from Lemma 1 that the Nash equilibria in (15)
can be alternatively obtained as the fixed-points of the mapping
defined in (22)
p⋆q =
[−insrq(p⋆−q)]Pq , ∀q ∈ Ω. (23)
Lemma 1 is also the key result to study contraction properties
of mapping wf and thus, based on (23), to derive conditions
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for the uniqueness of the NE and convergence of distributed
algorithms. The main result is summarized in the following
theorem that comes from [19, Proposition 2].7
Theorem 3 (Contraction property of the mapping wf ):
Given w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T> 0, the mapping wf defined in
(16) is Lipschitz continuous on P:∥∥∥wf(p(1))−wf(p(2))∥∥∥w
2,block
≤ ‖Smax‖w∞,mat
×
∥∥p(1) − p(2)∥∥w
2,block
,
(24)
∀p(1), p(2) ∈ P , where ‖·‖w2,block , ‖·‖w∞,mat, and Smax are
defined in (18), (20), and (21), respectively. Furthermore, if
‖Smax‖w∞,mat < 1, (25)
then mapping wf is a block-contraction with modulus
‖Smax‖w∞,mat. 
Given Theorem 3, it follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem
2, that condition ‖Smax‖w∞,mat < 1 is sufficient to guaran-
tee the uniqueness of the NE of the game as well as the
convergence of totally asynchronous algorithm based on the
waterfilling mapping wf in (16) [19], [20].
Approach #2: Multiuser waterfilling as solution of an
Affine VI [12] - In [12], the authors established an interesting
reformulation of the rate maximization game as a linear
complementarity problem (LCP) [39]. More specifically, they
proved that the nonlinear system of KKT optimality conditions
of the q-th user convex problem in G , given by [where
a ⊥ b means that the two scalars a and b are orthogonal,
i.e., a · b = 0]8
− |Hqq(k)|
2
σ2q(k) +
∑Q
r=1 |Hrq(k)|2pr(k)
+ µq − νq,k = 0, ∀k,
0 ≤ µq ⊥
(
Pq −
∑N
k=1 pq(k)
)
≥ 0,
0 ≤ νq,k ⊥ pq(k) ≥ 0, ∀k,
(26)
is equivalent to [12, Proposition 1]:
0 ≤ pq(k) ⊥
(
σ2q(k)
|Hqq(k)|2 +
Q∑
r=1
|Hrq(k)|2
|Hqq(k)|2 pr(k) + λq
)
≥ 0,
∀k,
λq = free,
∑N
k=1 pq(k) = Pq.(27)
As observed in [12], (27) for all q ∈ Ω represents
the KKT conditions of the Affine VI (AVI) (P , σ˜,M)
defined by the polyhedral set P and the affine map-
ping p 7→ σ˜ + Mp (see [39] for more details on
the AVI problems), where p , [pT1 , . . . ,pTQ]T , σ˜ ,
[σ˜T1 , . . . , σ˜
T
Q]
T
, and M is a block partition matrix M ,
[Mrq]r,q∈Ω, with pq = [pq(1), . . . , pq(N)]
T , σ˜q =
[σ2q(1)/|Hqq(1)|2, . . . , σ2q(N) /|Hqq(N)|2]T and Mqr ,
7We refer the interested reader to [19], [20] for mode general results on
contraction properties of the wf mapping.
8Observe that in [12], the authors considered equivalently for each user q ∈
Ω the power constraint
PN
k=1 pq(k) ≤ Pq, rather than
PN
k=1 pq(k) = Pq ,
as we did in (14).
Diag
(|Hrq(1)|2/|Hqq(1)|2, . . . , |Hrq(N)|2/|Hqq(N)|2), for
r, q ∈ Ω.
It follows that the vector p⋆ ∈ P is a NE of the game G
if and only if it satisfies the AVI (P , σ˜,M) [39], [40]:
(p− p⋆)T (σ˜ +Mp⋆) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P. (28)
Building on this result and the properties of AVI problems
(cf. [39], [40]), the authors in [12] derived sufficient conditions
for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the global
convergence of synchronous sequential IWFA.
It can be show that the AVI (P , σ˜, M) in (28) is equivalent
to the fixed-point equation in (23) [40], [39], establishing the
link between the solutions to (28)−the fixed-points of the
waterfilling mapping wf in (16)−and the interpretation of the
mapping wf as a projection (Lemma 1), as given in [14],
[19]9. In fact, the convergence conditions obtained in [12] for
the synchronous sequential IWFA coincide with (25) (for a
proper choice of vector w [19]).10 Observe that they are a
special case of those obtained in [20, Corollary 2].
Approach #3: Multiuser waterfilling as a piecewise affine
function [16], [40, Ch. 4] - In [16], the authors proved global
convergence of different waterfilling based algorithms building
on the key result that the waterfilling mapping wf : P 7→ P
can be equivalently written as a piecewise affine (PA) function
on RQN [40, Ch. 4]. In fact, the result in [16] follows the
same steps as Propositions 4.1.1 and 4.2.2 in [40, Ch. 4] and,
interestingly, can be obtained directly from our interpretation
of the wf as a projection (Lemma 1) and some properties of
the PA functions in [40, Ch. 4], as detailed next. We introduce
the following intermediate definitions first.
Definition 2 ([40, Def. 4.1.3]): A continuous function f : Rn 7→
Rm is said to be piecewise affine (PA) if there exists a finite
family of affine functions {fk(x) = Akx + bk}Kk=1 for some
positive integer K and {(Ak,bk)}Kk=1, with each fk : Rn 7→
Rm, such that for all x ∈ Rn, f(x) ∈ {f1(x), . . . , fK(x)}. 
PA functions have many interesting properties (we refer
the interested reader to [40, Ch. 4] for an in-depth study of
the theory of PA functions). Here, we are interested in the
following one, which follows directly from [40, Proposition
4.2.2 (c)].
Lemma 2: Any PA map f : Rn 7→ Rm is globally Lipschitz
continuous on Rn:∥∥∥f(x(1))− f(x(2))∥∥∥
vec
≤ α
∥∥∥x(1) − x(2)∥∥∥
vec
,
∀x(1), x(2) ∈ Rn, (29)
with Lipschitz constant α , maxk∈{1,...,K} ‖Ak‖mat, where
‖·‖vec is any vector norm and ‖·‖mat is the matrix norm
induced by ‖·‖vec . 
The link between our interpretation of the wf mapping as a
projector (Lemma 1) and the interpretation of wf as PA map
([16, Theorem 5]) is given by the following [40, Prop. 4.1.4].
9Papers [18], [19] have been originally submitted on September 2004.
10Recall that condition (25) is valid also for the convergence of the
asynchronous IWFA (Theorem 2) [20].
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Lemma 3: Let X be a polyhedral set in Rn.11 Then, the
Euclidean projector onto X is a PA function on Rn. 
According to Lemma 1, for any given p ≥ 0, the wa-
terfilling wf(p) in (16) is the Euclidean projector of vector
−insr(p) , −[insr1(p−1)T , . . . , insrQ(p−Q)T ]T onto the
convex set P , which is a polyhedral set. It then follows from
Lemma 3 that wf(p) is a PA function, i.e., there exists a finite
family of affine functions {fk(p) = Akp+bk}Kk=1 such that,
for every p ≥ 0 we have
wf(p) = Akp+bk, for some k ∈ {1, . . .K}, (30)
which coincides with the result in [16, Theorem 5]. The
expression of the affine pieces {(Ak,bk)}Kk=1 of wf(p) can
be obtained exploring the structure of the waterfilling solution
(16). We omit the details here because of space limitations
(see ([16, Theorem 5]).
Contraction properties of the wf operator interpreted as
PA map on RQN as stated in [16, Theorem 7] are a direct
consequence of properties of the PA functions. In particular,
it follows from Lemma 2 that, if
α = max
k∈{1,...,K}
‖Ak‖mat < 1, (31)
then the wf mapping is a contraction in the vector norm ‖ ·
‖vec. Exploring different vector norms, one can easily obtain
different sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE of
the game and the convergence of distributed algorithms, based
on thewf mapping. Observe that, according to Theorem 2, if a
block-maximum norm is used in (29) (see also Theorem 3 and
Theorem 5 in Section IV-B2), then condition (31) guarantees
also the global convergence of totally asynchronous algorithms
[20], [16].
Approach #4: Multiuser waterfilling via the max-lemma
[7], [15] - In [15], the authors, among all, derived conditions
for the global convergence of the synchronous sequential and
simultaneous iterative waterfilling algorithms (implying also
the uniqueness of the NE). Conditions in [15] generalize
those obtained in [7] for the two-player game to the case
of arbitrary number of players. We show now that results in
[15] come from Theorem 2 as special case, if a proper vector
norm is chosen. To this end, we introduce first the following
intermediate definitions and results.
A key point in the proof of convergence in [15] is given by
the following max-lemma [15, Lemma 1].
Lemma 4: Let f : R 7→ R and g : R 7→ R be a non-
decreasing and non-increasing functions on R, respectively.
If there exists a unique x⋆ such that f(x⋆) = g(x⋆), and
function f and g are strictly increasing and strictly decreasing
at x = x⋆, then
x⋆ = argmin
x
{max{f(x), g(x)}}. (32)

11Roughly speaking, a polyhedral is the intersection of a finite number of
halfspaces and hyperplanes (see, e.g., [42, Ch. 2.2.4]).
Let us introduce the following error dynamic, as defined in
[15]:
eq(n+ 1) , max
{∑
k
[
p
(n+1)
q (k)− p(n)q (k)
]+
,
∑
k
[
p
(n+1)
q (k)− p(n)q (k)
]−}
,
(33)
with n ∈ N+ = {0, 1, 2, . . .} , where p(n)q =
[p
(n)
q (1), . . . , p
(n)
q (N)]T is the vector of the power allocation
of user q ∈ Ω, generated at the discrete time n by the sequen-
tial or simultaneous IWFA [starting from any arbitrary feasible
point p(0)], [x]+ , max(0, x), and [x]− = max(0,−x).
Using Lemma 4 and following the same steps as in [15],
results in [15] can be restated in terms of the error vector
e(n+1) , [e
(n+1)
1 , . . . , e
(n+1)
Q ] as:∥∥∥e(n+1)∥∥∥
∞,vec
≤ α
∥∥∥e(n)∥∥∥
∞,vec
, ∀n ∈ N+, (34)
where α , (Q−1)maxk, r 6=q |Hrq(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2 , and ‖·‖∞,vec denotes
the l∞ norm [see (19) with w = 1]. It follows from (34) that,
under α < 1, both synchronous sequential and simultaneous
IWFAs globally converge to the unique NE of the game [7],
[15]. Observe that this condition implies the contraction of
the waterfilling mapping as given in Theorem 3, showing the
more generality of our sufficient condition (25) than that in
[7], [15].
Extension: We generalize now the results in [7], [15], so that
we can use Theorem 2 and enlarge the convergence conditions
of [7], [15], making them to coincide with (25) and valid also
for the asynchronous IWFA [20]. To this end, we introduce a
new vector norm, as detailed next.
Inspired by (33), we introduce the following norm:
‖x‖1,∞,vec , max
{∥∥(x)+∥∥
1,vec
,
∥∥(x)−∥∥
1,vec
}
, x ∈ RN ,
(35)
where ‖·‖1,vec denotes the l1 norm [41]. Some properties of
‖·‖1,∞,vec are listed in the following lemma (we omit the proof
because of space limitation).
Lemma 5: The norm ‖·‖1,∞,vec in (35) is a valid vector
norm (in the sense that it satisfies the axioms of a norm [41]).
Moreover, the following nonexpansion property holds true:12∥∥∥(µx1− x0)+ − (µy1− y0)+∥∥∥
1,∞,vec
≤ ‖x0 − y0‖1,∞,vec ,
∀x0,y0 ∈ RN+ , (36)
where the waterlevels µx and µy satisfy 1T (µx1− x0)+ =
1T
(
µy1− y0
)+
= PT , (with PT an arbitrary nonnegative
number), and 1 denotes the N -dimensional vector of all ones.

Interestingly, Lemma 5 provides the nonexpansion property
of the (single-user) waterfilling solution in the vector norm
‖·‖1,∞,vec. It also represents the key result to prove the
contraction property of the multiuser waterfilling mapping wf
12Interestingly, one can prove that the nonexpansion property as stated in
(36) also holds true if in (36) the norm ‖·‖
1,∞,vec is replaced by the l1 norm.
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in (16) in the block-maximum norm ‖·‖w1,∞,block associated to
‖·‖1,∞,vec, defined, for each w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T> 0, as
‖wf(p)‖w1,∞,block , maxq∈Ω
∥∥wf
q
(p−q)
∥∥
1,∞,vec
wq
. (37)
The main result is stated next (the proof is based on Lemma
5 and follows similar steps of that in [20, Appendix A]; see
also Theorem 5 in Section IV-B2).
Theorem 4 (Contraction property of mapping wf ): Given
w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T> 0, the mapping wf defined in (16) is
Lipschitz continuous on P:∥∥∥wf(p(1))−wf(p(2))∥∥∥w
1,∞,block
≤ ‖Smax‖w∞,mat
× ∥∥p(1) − p(2)∥∥w
1,∞,block
,
(38)
∀p(1), p(2) ∈ P , where ‖·‖w1,∞,block, ‖·‖w∞,mat, and Smax are
defined in (37), (20), and (21), respectively. 
Comparing Theorem 3 with Theorem 4, one infers that
both theorems provide the same sufficient conditions for the
waterfilling mapping wf to be a contraction and thus the same
sufficient conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE
and the convergence of asynchronous IWFAs [19], [20].
B. MIMO Gaussian Interference Channels
In this section, we generalize our interpretation of the water-
filling projector in the frequency-selective case to the MIMO
multiuser case. For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on
MIMO systems whose direct channel matrices Hqq are square
and nonsingular. The more general case is much more involved
and goes beyond the scope of the present paper; it has been
considered in [21].
1) Multiuser waterfilling in Gaussian MIMO interference
channels : We first introduce the following intermediate result.
Proposition 1: Given Rn ≻ 0, H ∈ Cn×n, and PT > 0,
let define the following two convex optimization problems:
(P1) : maximizeX0 log det
(
Rn +HXH
H
)
subject to Tr{X} ≤ PT ,
(39)
and
(P2) :
minimize
X0
‖X−X0‖2F
subject to Tr{X} = PT .
(40)
If X0 in (P2) is chosen as X0 = −
(
HHR−1n H
)−1
, then both
problems (P1) and (P2) have the same unique solution.
Proof: Problem (P1) [and (P2)] is convex and admits a
unique solution, since the objective function is strictly concave
(and strictly convex) on X  0. The Lagrangian function L
associated to (39) is
L = − log det
(
Rn +HXH
H
)
−Tr(ΨX)+λ (Tr(X) − PT ) ,
(41)
which leads to the following KKT optimality conditions
(Slater’s conditions are satisfied [42, Ch. 5.9.1]):
−HH
(
Rn +HXH
H
)−1
H+ λI = Ψ, (42)
Ψ  0, X  0, Tr(ΨX) = 0, (43)
λ ≥ 0, λ (Tr(X)− PT ) = 0, Tr(X) ≤ PT . (44)
First of all, observe that λ must be positive. Otherwise, (42)
would lead to
0 ≻ −HH
(
Rn +HXH
H
)−1
H = Ψ  0, (45)
which cannot be true. We rewrite now (42)-(44) in a more
convenient form. To this end, we introduce
X0 , −
(
HHR−1n H
)−1 ≺ 0, (46)
so that
HH
(
Rn +HXH
H
)−1
H = (X−X0)−1 ≻ 0. (47)
Then, using the fact that λ > 0 and absorbing in (42)-(43) the
slack variable Ψ, system (42)-(44) can be rewritten as
X
[
− (X−X0)−1 + λI
]
= 0, (48)
X  0, − (X−X0)−1 + λI  0, (49)
λ > 0, Tr(X) = PT , (50)
where in (48) we have used the following fact [38, fact 8.10.3]
Tr(ΨX) = 0 ⇔ ΨX = 0, ∀Ψ,X  0. (51)
Since λ > 0, (48)-(50) become
X
[
(X−X0)− 1
λ
I
]
= 0, (52)
X  0, − (X−X0)−1 + λI  0, (53)
λ > 0, Tr(X) = PT . (54)
We show now that (52)-(54) is equivalent to
X [(X−X0) + µI] = 0, (55)
X  0, X−X0 + µI  0, (56)
µ = free, Tr(X) = PT . (57)
(52)-(54) ⇒ (55)-(57): Let (X, λ) be a solution of (52)-(54). A
solution of (55)-(57) is obtained using (X, µ), with µ = − 1λ .
(55)-(57) ⇒ (52)-(54): Let (X, µ) be a solution of (55)-(57). It
must be µ < 0; otherwise, since X−X0 ≻ 0 [see (46)], (55)
would lead to X = 0, which contradicts the power constraint
in (57). Setting λ = − 1µ , it is easy to check that (X, λ) satisfies
(52)-(54).
The system (55)-(57) represents the KKT optimality con-
ditions of problem (40) with X0 defined in (46); which
completes the proof.
Denoting by [X0]Qq the matrix projection of X0 with
respect to the Frobenius norm onto the set Qq defined in
(5)−the solution to problem (P2) in (40) with PT = Pq−and
using Proposition 1 we have directly the following.13
13A more general expression of the waterfilling projection valid for the
general case of singular (possibly) rectangular channel matrices is given in
[21].
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Lemma 6: The waterfilling operator WFq (Q−q) in (9)
can be equivalently written as
WFq (Q−q) =
[
− (HHqqR−1−q(Q−q)Hqq)−1]
Qq
, (58)
where Qq is defined in (5). 
Comparing (10) with (58), it is straightforward to see that
all the Nash equilibria of game G can be alternatively obtained
as the fixed-points of the mapping defined in (58):
Q⋆q =
[
− (HHqqR−1−q(Q⋆−q)Hqq)−1]
Qq
, ∀q ∈ Ω. (59)
Remark 5 - Nonexpansive property of the MIMO waterfilling
operator. Thanks to the interpretation of MIMO waterfilling in
(9) as a projector, one can obtain the following nonexpansive
property of the waterfilling operator that will be used in the
next section to derive the contraction properties of the MIMO
waterfilling mapping.
Lemma 7: Given q ∈ Ω, let [·]
Qq
denote the matrix pro-
jection onto the convex set Qq with respect to the Frobenius
norm, as defined in (40). Then, [·]
Qq
satisfies the following
nonexpansive property:∥∥∥[X]Qq − [Y]Qq
∥∥∥
F
≤ ‖X−Y‖F , ∀ X,Y ∈ CnTq×nTq .
(60)

2) Contraction property of MIMO multiuser waterfilling:
Building on Lemmas 6 and 7, we derive now sufficient
conditions for the waterfilling mapping to be a contraction,
under a proper norm. Our result is the natural extension of
Theorem 3 to the MIMO case.
As in the SISO case, we define first an appropriate block-
maximum norm for the multiuser waterfilling mapping. Given
WF(Q) = (WFq(Q−q))q∈Ω : Q 7→ Q, (61)
where Q = Q1×· · ·×QQ, with Qq and WFq(Q−q) defined
in (5) and (58), respectively, we introduce the following block-
maximum norm on Cn×n, with n = nT1 + . . .+nTQ , defined
as [22]
‖WF(Q)‖wF,block , maxq∈Ω
‖WFq(Q−q)‖F
wq
, (62)
where ‖·‖F is the Frobenius norm and w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T >
0 is any positive weight vector. Finally, let S ∈ RQ×Q+ be the
nonnegative matrix defined as
[S]qr ,
{
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
)
,
0,
if r 6= q,
otherwise. (63)
where ρ (A) denotes the spectral radius14 of A. The con-
traction property of the waterfilling mapping is given in the
following theorem.
14The spectral radius ρ (A) of the matrix A is defined as ρ (A) ,
max{|λ| : λ ∈ σ(A)}, with σ(A) denoting the spectrum of A [41].
Theorem 5 (Contraction property of mapping WF):
Given w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T> 0, the mapping WF defined in
(61) is Lipschitz continuous on Q:∥∥WF(Q(1))−WF(Q(2))∥∥w
F,block ≤ ‖S‖w∞,mat
×
∥∥Q(1) −Q(2)∥∥w
F,block ,(64)
∀Q(1),Q(2) ∈ Q, where ‖·‖wF,block , ‖·‖w∞,mat and S are defined
in (62), (20), and (63), respectively, and Q , Q1×· · ·×QQ,
with Qq given in (5). Furthermore, if
‖S‖w∞,mat < 1, (65)
then mapping WF is a block-contraction with modulus α =
‖S‖w∞,mat.
Proof: The proof of the theorem in the general case of ar-
bitrary channel matrices is quite involved [21]. Here, we focus
only on the simpler case in which the direct channel matrices
{Hqq}q∈Ω are square and nonsingular. Under this assumption,
according to Lemma 6, each component WF(Q−q) of the
mapping WF can be rewritten as in (58).
The proof consists in showing that the mapping WF
satisfies (64), with α = ‖S‖w∞,mat.
Given Q(1) =
(
Q
(1)
q , . . . ,Q
(1)
Q
)
∈ Q and Q(2) =(
Q
(2)
1 , . . . ,Q
(2)
Q
)
∈ Q, let define, for each q ∈ Ω,
eWFq ,
∥∥∥WFq (Q(1)−q)−WFq (Q(2)−q)∥∥∥
F
, (66)
eq ,
∥∥∥Q(1)q −Q(2)q ∥∥∥
F
. (67)
Then, we have:
eWFq =
∥∥∥∥∥
[
−
(
HHqqR
−1
q (Q
(1)
−q)Hqq
)−1]
Qq
−
[
−
(
HHqqR
−1
q (Q
(2)
−q)Hqq
)−1]
Qq
∥∥∥∥∥
F
(68)
≤
∥∥∥∥(HHqqR−1q (Q(1)−q)Hqq)−1 − (HHqqR−1q (Q(2)−q)Hqq)−1
∥∥∥∥
F(69)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥H−1qq

∑
r 6=q
Hrq
(
Q(1)r −Q(2)r
)
HHrq

H−Hqq
∥∥∥∥∥∥
F (70)
≤
∑
r 6=q
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
) ∥∥∥(Q(1)r −Q(2)r )∥∥∥
F
(71)
,
∑
r 6=q
[S]qr
∥∥∥(Q(1)r −Q(2)r )∥∥∥
F
=
∑
r 6=q
[S]qr er, (72)
∀Q(1), Q(2) ∈ Q and ∀q ∈ Ω, where: (68) follows from (58)
(Lemma 6); (69) follows from the nonexpansive property of
the projector in the Frobenius norm as given in (60) (Lemma
7); (70) follows from the nonsingularity of the channel matri-
ces {Hqq}; (71) follows from the triangle inequality [41] and
from [21] ∥∥∥AXAH∥∥∥
F
≤ λmax
(
AHA
) ‖X‖F , (73)
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where X = XH and A ∈ Cn×m; and (72) follows from the
definition of matrix S in (63).
Introducing the vectors
eWF , [eWF1 , . . . , eWFQ ]
T , and e , [e1, . . . , eQ]T , (74)
with eWFq and eq defined in (66) and (67), respectively, the
set of inequalities in (72) can be rewritten in vector form as
0 ≤ eWF ≤ Se, ∀Q(1), Q(2) ∈ Q. (75)
Using the weighted maximum norm ‖·‖w∞,vec defined in (19)
in combination with (75), we have
‖eWF‖w∞,vec ≤ ‖Se‖w∞,vec ≤ ‖S‖w∞,mat ‖e‖w∞,vec , (76)
∀Q(1),Q(2) ∈ Q and w > 0, where ‖·‖w∞,mat is the matrix
norm induced by the vector norm ‖·‖w∞,vec in (19) and defined
in (20) [41]. Finally, using (76) and (62), we obtain,∥∥∥WF(Q(1))−WF(Q(2))∥∥∥w
F,block
= ‖eWF‖w∞,vec
≤ ‖S‖w∞,mat
∥∥Q(1) −Q(2)∥∥w
F,block ,(77)
∀Q(1),Q(2) ∈ Q and ∀w > 0, which leads to a block-
contraction for the mapping WF if ‖S‖w∞,mat < 1, implying
condition (65).
V. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE NE
Using results obtained in the previous section, we can
now study game G and derive conditions for existence and
uniqueness of the NE, as given next.
Theorem 6: Game G always admits a NE, for any set of
channel matrices and transmit power of the users. Further-
more, the NE is unique if
ρ (S) < 1, (C1)
where S is defined in (63).
Proof: According to the interpretation of the waterfilling
mappingWF in (9) as a projector (cf. Lemma 6), the existence
of a NE of game G is guaranteed by the existence of a solution
of the fixed-point equation (59). Invoking Theorem 1(a), the
existence of a fixed-point follows from the continuity of the
waterfilling projector (58) on Q, for any given set of channel
matrices {Hrq}r,q∈Ω (implied from the continuity of the
projection operator [22, Proposition 3.2c] and the continuity
of each R−1−q(Q−q) on Q−q15), and from the convexity and
compactness of the joint admissible strategy set Q.16
According to Theorem 1(b), a sufficient condition for the
uniqueness of the NE of game G is that the waterfilling
mapping WF in (9) be a contraction with respect to some
norm. It follows from Theorem 5 that WF is a block-
contraction if condition (65) is satisfied for some w > 0.
15This result can be proved using [37, Theorem 10.7.1].
16According to [32, Theorem 1], the existence of a NE of game G can
also be proved showing that the game is a concave game: 1) The set Qq of
feasible strategy profiles of each player q is compact and convex; and 2) The
payoff function of each player q is continuous in Q ∈ Q and concave in
Qq ∈ Qq , for any given Q−q ∈ Q−q (this follows from the concavity of
the log function [42]).
Since S in (65) is a nonnegative matrix, there exists a positive
vector w such that [22, Corollary 6.1]
‖S‖w∞,mat < 1 ⇔ ρ (S) < 1, (78)
which proves the sufficiency of (C1).
To give additional insight into the physical interpretation of
sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE, we provide
the following corollary of Theorem 6.
Corollary 1: A sufficient condition for (C1) is given by one
of the two following set of conditions:
1
wq
∑
r 6=q
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
H
qqHrq
)
wr < 1, ∀q ∈ Ω, (C2)
1
wr
∑
q 6=r
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
H
qqHrq
)
wq < 1, ∀r ∈ Ω, (C3)
where w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T is a positive vector. 
Remark 6 - Physical interpretation of uniqueness conditions.
Looking at conditions (C2)-(C3), it turns out, as expected, that
the uniqueness of a NE is ensured if the interference among
the links is sufficiently small. The importance of conditions
(C2)-(C3) is that they quantify how small the interference
must be to guarantee that the equilibrium is indeed unique.
Specifically, condition (C2) can be interpreted as a constraint
on the maximum amount of interference that each receiver
can tolerate, whereas (C3) introduces an upper bound on
the maximum level of interference that each transmitter is
allowed to generate. This result agrees with the intuition that,
as the MUI becomes negligible, the rates of the users become
decoupled and then the rate-maximization problem in (4) for
each user admits a unique solution.
Remark 7 - Special cases. Conditions in Theorem 6 and
Corollary 1 for the uniqueness of the NE can be applied to
arbitrary MIMO interference systems,17 irrespective of the
specific structure of channel matrices. Interestingly, most of
the conditions known in the literature [7]-[15] for the rate-
maximization game in SISO frequency-selective interference
channels and OFDM transmission come naturally from (C1) as
special cases. In fact, using the Toeplitz and circulant structure
of the channel matrices Hrq = WDrqWH (cf. Section
IV-A), matrix S in the uniqueness condition (C1), defined in
(63), reduces to matrix Smax defined in (21), showing that
our uniqueness condition coincides with those given in [19],
[20] and enlarges those obtained in [7]-[11] and [13], [15].
Observe that condition (C1), with Smax defined in (21), can
be further weakened by computing the “max” over a subset
of {1, . . . , N}, obtained from {1, . . . , N} by removing the
subcarrier indexes where each user will never transmit, for
any set of channel realizations and interference profile [18],
[19]. An algorithm to compute such a set is given in [18].
Recently, in [31], the authors studied the game G and proved
using [32, Theorem 2.2] that the NE of the game is unique
17Recall that here we have concentrated on square nonsingular (direct)
MIMO channels. However, condition (C1) can be generalized to the case
of rectangular channel matrices [21].
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if the MUI at each receiver q, measured by the interference-
to-noise ratios {Pr/σ2q}r 6=q where σ2q is the variance of the
thermal noise at receiver q, is smaller than a given unspecified
threshold. Differently from [31], our results provide a set of
sufficient conditions that can be checked in practice, since they
explicitly quantify how strong the MUI must be to guarantee
the uniqueness of the NE.
VI. MIMO ASYNCHRONOUS ITERATIVE WATERFILLING
ALGORITHM
According to the framework developed in Section III, to reach
the Nash equilibria of game G , one can use an instance of
the totally asynchronous scheme of [22] (cf. Section III-B),
based on the waterfilling mapping (9), called asynchronous
Iterative WaterFilling Algorithm (IWFA) [21]. In the asyn-
chronous IWFA, all the users maximize their own rate in
a totally asynchronous way via the single user waterfilling
solution (9). According to this asynchronous procedure, some
users are allowed to update their strategy more frequently
than the others, and they might perform these updates using
outdated information on the interference caused by the others.
We show in the following that, whatever the asynchronous
mechanism is, such a procedure converges to a stable NE of
the game, under the same sufficient conditions guaranteeing
the uniqueness of the equilibrium given in Theorem 6.
To provide a formal description of the proposed asyn-
chronous IWFA, we need the following preliminary defini-
tions. We assume, w.l.o.g., that the set of times at which
one or more users update their strategies is the discrete set
T = N+ = {0, 1, 2, . . .} . Let Q(n)q denote the covariance
matrix of the vector signal transmitted by user q at the n-
th iteration, and let Tq ⊆ T denote the set of times n at
which Q(n)q is updated (thus, at time n /∈ Tq, Q(n)q is left
unchanged). Let τqr(n) denote the most recent time at which
the interference from user r is perceived by user q at the n-
th iteration (observe that τ qr(n) satisfies 0 ≤ τ qr(n) ≤ n).
Hence, if user q updates his own covariance matrix at the n-
th iteration, then he chooses his optimal Q(n)q , according to
(9), and using the interference level caused by
Q
(τq(n))
−q ,
(
Q
(τq
1
(n))
1 , . . . ,Q
(τqq−1(n))
q−1 ,
Q
(τq
q+1
(n))
q+1 , . . . ,Q
(τq
Q
(n))
Q
)
. (79)
The overall system is said to be totally asynchronous if
the following weak assumptions are satisfied for each q [22]:
A1) 0 ≤ τ qr(n) ≤ n; A2) limk→∞ τqr(nk) = +∞; and A3)
|Tq| = ∞; where {nk} is a sequence of elements in Tq
that tends to infinity. Assumption (A1)-(A3) are standard in
asynchronous convergence theory [22], and they are fulfilled
in any practical implementation. In fact, (A1) simply indicates
that, in the current iteration n, each user q can use only
interference vectors Q(τ
q(n))
−q allocated by others in previous
iterations (to preserve causality). Assumption (A2) states that,
for any given iteration index n1, values of the components
of Q(τ
q(n))
−q in (79) generated prior to n1, will not be used
in the updates of Q(n)q after a sufficiently long time n2; this
guarantees that old information is eventually purged from the
system. Finally, assumption (A3) indicates that no user fails
to update his own strategy as time n goes on.
Using the above notation, the asynchronous IWFA is for-
mally described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: MIMO Asynchronous IWFA
Set n = 0 and Q(0)q = any feasible covariance matrix;
for n = 0 : Nit
Q(n+1)q =
{
WFq
(
Q
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if n ∈ Tq,
Q
(n)
q , otherwise;
∀q ∈ Ω
(80)
end
It follows directly from Theorems 2 and 5 that convergence
of the algorithm is guaranteed under the following sufficient
conditions.
Theorem 7: Suppose that condition (C1) in Theorem 6
is satisfied. Then, as Nit → ∞, the asynchronous IWFA,
described in Algorithm 1, converges to the unique NE of
game G for any set of feasible initial conditions and updating
schedule. 
Remark 8 - Global convergence and robustness of the algo-
rithm. Even though the rate maximization game G and the
consequent waterfilling mapping (9) are nonlinear, condition
(C1) guarantees the global convergence of the asynchronous
IWFA. Observe that Algorithm 1 contains as special cases
a plethora of algorithms, each one obtained by a possible
choice of the scheduling of the users in the updating procedure
(i.e., the parameters {τqr(n)} and {Tq}). Two special cases
are the sequential and the simultaneous MIMO IWFA, where
the users update their own strategies sequentially and simulta-
neously, respectively. The important result stated in Theorem
7 is that all the algorithms resulting as special cases of the
asynchronous IWFA are guaranteed to reach the unique NE
of the game, under the same set of convergence conditions
(provided that (A1)-(A3) are satisfied), since conditions in
(C1) do not depend on the particular choice of {Tq} and
{τqr(n)}.
Remark 9 - Distributed nature of the algorithm. Since the
asynchronous IWFA is based on the waterfilling solution (9),
it can be implemented in a distributed way, where each user, to
maximize his own rate, only needs to measure the covariance
matrix of the overall interference-plus-noise and waterfill over
this matrix. More interestingly, according to the asynchronous
scheme, the users may update their strategies using a poten-
tially outdated version of the interference and, furthermore,
some users are allowed to update their covariance matrix
more often than others, without affecting the convergence of
the algorithm. These features strongly relax the constraints
on the synchronization of the users’ updates with respect to
those imposed, for example, by the simultaneous or sequential
updating schemes.
Remark 10 - Well-known cases. The MIMO asynchronous
IWFA, described in Algorithm 1 is the natural generalization
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of the asynchronous IWFA proposed in [20], to solve the
rate-maximization game in Gaussian SISO frequency-selective
parallel interference channels. Algorithm in [20] can be in fact
obtained directly from Algorithm 1 using the following equiv-
alences: Qq ⇔ pq , WFq (·) ⇔ wfq (·) , and Qq ⇔ Pq,
where WFq (·) , wfq (·), Qq, and Pq are defined in (9),
(16), (5), and (14), respectively. Similarly, the well-known
sequential IWFA [7]-[14], [19] and simultaneous IWFA [14]-
[16], [19] proposed in the literature are special cases of
Algorithm 1, using the above equivalences.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first provide some numerical results
illustrating the benefits of MIMO transceivers in the multiuser
context. Then, we compare some of the proposed algorithms
in terms of convergence speed.
Example 1 − MIMO vs. SISO. MIMO systems have shown
great potential for providing high spectral efficiency in both
isolated, single-user, wireless links without interference or
multiple access and broadcast channels. Here we quantifies,
by simulations, this potential gain for MIMO interference
systems. In Figure 1, we plot the sum-rate of a two-user
frequency-selective MIMO system as a function of the inter-
pair distance among the links, for different number of trans-
mit/receive antennas. The rate curves are averaged over 500
independent channel realizations, whose taps are simulated
as i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit
variance. For the sake of simplicity, the system is assumed
to be symmetric, i.e., the transmitters have the same power
budget and the interference links are at the same distance
(i.e., drq = dqr, ∀q, r), so that the cross channel gains are
comparable in average sense. The path loss γ is assumed to
be γ = 2.5.
From the figure one infer that, as for isolated single-user
systems or multiple access/broadcast channels, also in MIMO
interference channels, increasing the number of antennas at
both the transmitter and the receiver side leads to a better
performance. The interesting result, coming from Figure 1,
is that the incremental gain due to the use of multiple trans-
mit/receive antennas is almost independent of the interference
level in the system, since the MIMO (incremental) gains in
the high-interference case (small values of drq/dqq) almost
coincide with the corresponding (incremental) gains obtained
in the low-interference case (large values of drq/dqq), at least
for the system simulated in Figure 1. This desired property is
due to the fact that the MIMO channel provides more degrees
of freedom for each user than those available in the SISO
channel, that can be explored to find out the best partition of
the available resources for each user, possibly cancelling the
MUI.
Example 2 − Sequential vs. simultaneous IWFA. In Figure 2
we compare the performance of the sequential and simultane-
ous IWFA, in terms of convergence speed, for a given set of
MIMO channel realizations. We consider a cellular network
composed by 7 (regular) hexagonal cells, sharing the same
spectrum. Hence, simultaneous transmissions of different cells
can interfere with each other. The Base Stations (BS) and the
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Fig. 1. Sum-Rate of the users versus drq/dqq ; drq = dqr, drr =
dqq = 1, r = 1, 2, Q = 2, γ = 2.5, P1/σ
2
1 = P2/σ
2
2 = 5dB,
Lh = 6, N = 16.
Mobile Terminals (MT) are equipped with 4 antennas. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that in each cell there is
only one active link, corresponding to the transmission from
the BS (placed at the center of the cell) to a MT placed in
a corner of the cell. According to this geometry, each MT
receives an useful signal that is comparable in average sense
with the interference signal transmitted by the BSs of two
adjacent cells. The overall network is thus stitched out of eight
4×4 MIMO interference wideband channels, according to (1).
In Figure 2, we show the rate evolution of the links of three
cells corresponding to the sequential IWFA and simultaneous
IWFA as a function of the iteration index n . To make the
figure not excessively overcrowded, we plot only the curves
of 3 out of 8 links. As expected, the sequential IWFA is slower
than the simultaneous IWFA, especially if the number of active
links Q is large, since each user is forced to wait for all the
users scheduled in advance, before updating his own power
allocation. The same qualitative behavior has been observed
changing the channel realizations and the number of antennas.
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Fig. 2. Rates of the links versus iterations: sequential IWFA (dashed
line curves) and simultaneous IWFA (solid line curves); Q = 8,
γ = 2.5, Pq/σ
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q = 5dB, ∀q ∈ Ω, Lh = 6, N = 16.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have considered the competitive maximization
of mutual information in noncooperative interfering networks
in a fully distributed fashion, based on game theory. We
have provided a unified view of main results obtained in
the past seven years, showing that the proposed approaches,
even apparently different, can be unified by our interpretation
of the watefilling solution as a proper projection onto a
polyhedral set. Building on this interpretation, we have shown
how to apply standard results from fixed-point and contraction
theory to the rate maximization game in SISO frequency-
selective channels, in order to obtain a unified set of sufficient
conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE and the
convergence of totally asynchronous distributed algorithms.
The proposed framework has also been generalized to the
(square) MIMO case. The obtained results are the natural
generalization of those obtained in the SISO case.
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